A previous post has the title 'Moral Relativism?' and the subsequent discussion had very little to do with moral relativism. It had everything to do with the philosophical quandary surrounding the concepts of determinism and free will.
This post will also have nothing to do with moral relativism.
I have been working on the problem lately and I think I might see the outline of a kind of solution.
here are some notes on the fly ...
(A) Suppose that determinism is true, and that our actions are governed by factors that are, in principle, completely predictable. Free will is an illusion brought about by the fact that it is beyond our abilities to account for all the factors at once.
(B) Suppose that it is also true that we make choices and that we can be rightly held morally responsible for our actions.
How is (A) reconcilable with (B)?
evolution
survival
predicting the future/induction increases survival chances
imagination increases survival chances
faculties of imagination and prediction applied to human behavior causes the illusion that we could have chosen otherwise than we did
moral responsibility comes from the notion we could have done otherwise
the knowledge that there is a chance we can be held morally responsible affects our actions and increases our survival rate, as a species
evolution, survival, faculty of imagination & prediction, all are caused by deterministic(? - for lack of a better term at the moment) processes
the feeling of freedom is reducible to the ability to imagine and predict - we imagine that we could have done otherwise, and we predict what would happen in a similar situation if we behave differently. Predictions become causes of future behavior. Our ability to imagine many different outcomes is one reason our behavior is so difficult to predict - each imagined course of action and its probable outcome are weighed
Conclusion: the ability to make choices is the result of deterministic processes
Imagination and prediction, presumably the output of deterministic processes --> this output in turn is a causal factor in future behavior. This leads to the FAULTY impression that we could have chosen to do other than we did. Nevertheless it is important not to lose the motivational impetus that holding each other morally responsible provides ... because we would be removing one of the causes of future good actions ... we can imagine and predict that evil would result.
PROBLEM: Assumes that all the processes involved are deterministic ones.
PROBLEM 2: Just because the processes leading to the ability to make choices are all deterministic, doesn't necessarily mean that choice-making itself is deterministic
This is so sloppy I know. I have never been so careless before. But I have one more final paper to write and then finals to study for and I decided just to get this out there to see what you think.
I'll most likely delete this in the morning.
Ha ha. Ever seen the Princess Bride? "All right Westley, good job, good night, I'll most likely kill you in the morning ..."
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5 comments:
hehe.. the major problem i see is problem two. It seems detrimental to the situation. So let us analyze it.
Is causation a transitive property?
IF C is caused by B and B is caused by A, is C caused by A?
One conclusion could be drawn from what I know about nietzsche, which is that causation is an illusion. We interpret causality to make sense of the world, but it exists in our mind and not the world itself.
But that doesn't seem to be the case because causation occurs without observers. If a lightning struck a tree in the forest, it would start a fire even if there were no observer to be there observing.
I don't know. I'm going to think of a method in which causation cannot be transitive. I'm also going to ask Dr. Korcz and see if there is any background on this idea.
p.s. are you free today at around 6:00? or do you need to be home to take care of your kids. I was going to suggest, gettig some kind of dinner like meal with Lydia and I. I need to take a picture of you Lydia and Graydon before we break off completly.
I'm glad you weren't offended by my comments, Snaars. I had second thoughts about them this morning. When I talked about the need to focus in on a single issue, I meant it to be constructive. But, in retrospect, I was afraid it would come across as a put-down.
A few quick responses to this post:
(1) You write, "moral responsibility comes from the notion we could have done otherwise". From the rest of your remarks, I take it you mean we could not, in fact, have done otherwise.
This leads to an objection which I will present as a question: Is it appropriate to punish someone for an action if s/he could not have done any other thing?
(2) You write, "Predictions become causes of future behavior." You mean that a mere mental image (imagining what we could do differently if a similar situation were to arise in future) is able to alter reality? That a mental image is sufficiently powerful to push aside the forces that would otherwise determine our actions, thereby creating space for us to act differently?
(3) You write, "the ability to make choices is the result of deterministic processes." I won't comment on this — obviously you know it's a paradoxical statement. But can you really hold to it, with intellectual integrity?
Finally, I'd like to refer you to a source that agrees with your basic thesis, that we are determined yet we have free will.
An organization called The Edge recently asked some well-known intellectuals an interesting question: What do you believe that you can't prove?
Michael Shermer (among other things, the publisher of Skeptic magazine), gave this answer:
The universe is ultimately determined, but we have free will.
As with the God question, scholars of considerable intellectual power for many millennia have failed to resolve the paradox of feeling free in a determined universe. One provisional solution is to think of the universe as so complex that the number of causes and the complexity of their interactions make the predetermination of human action pragmatically impossible....
The enormity of this complexity leads us to feel as if we are acting freely as uncaused causers, even though we are actually causally determined. Since no set of causes we select as the determiners of human action can be complete, the feeling of freedom arises out of this ignorance of causes. To that extent we may act as if we are free. There is much to gain, little to lose, and personal responsibility follows.
You can read his full answer at Michael Shermer. Perhaps it will be a useful reference in one of your courses.
For an amusing take on the same theme, see Susan Blackmore.
Q
i hope everything is going well... didn't see you in class..
the answer is causality, much like previously believed is transitive relation. If it occurs for A -> B and it occurs for B-> C then it occurs for A -> C heh...
Still think this is the method of attack...
BTW according to the arguments the best argument in the debate(if assumed as a duality) is the argument for determinism. It is an interesting argument.
Pure symbolic Logic, the argument is... kind of beautiful in a way.
Thanks for the heads-up Arglor, I'll definitely need to get those notes.
Q,
I was not offended at all. I am not emotionally committed to the position and I don't mind opposing viewpoints as long as they are thoughtful. The goal is to get closer to the truth, not to argue for argument's sake. I can tell by what you have written so far and from what I have read on 'Simply Put' that you are a thoughtful person, and that you will not post anything designed to be blatantly offensive. I appreciate your comments and you are welcome to post whatever and whenever you like.
About the argument for determinism - I am not so much asserting it's truth as I am presenting it for appraisal.
I take it as a given that we act rightly when we hold people morally responsible. Moral responsibility is predicated on free will, so I accept free will. But determinism also seems true, because causality seem to be a necessary truth (although it may not be logically necessary.)
I am going to stop here for lack of time, but soon I may post about the assymetricality of time - why is it that we see the past as immutable but the future is not? It has relevance to some of the comments in your last post.
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