I promised to do a post on the Euthyphro Argument, and here it is. I know it's been a long time coming. I had to postpone it a little bit on account of a Major Event (ME). I will post about ME soon. As usual, all polite, thoughtful comments are welcome. Enjoy!
Portions of the material I am using here are taken from my notes from a lecture given in 2002 by Dr. Keith Allen Korcz at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, for a philosophy course entitled 'Contemporary Moral Dilemmas.' Korcz has a talent for presenting arguments so simply, even I can understand them. This argument is widely known to theologians and philosophers of religion. You read the argument and judge whether it makes sense to you.
Divine Command Theory, or DC, is one way to see a relationship between ethics and religion. There are many varieties of DC, which claims that:
- What makes an action morally right, wrong, or neutral is God's command; and
- In order to determine what is right/wrong/neutral, we must determine what it is that God has commanded.
Notice that in order to determine what is right, wrong, or neutral, we must determine what God has commanded.
Notice also that any DC assumes the existence of God. This is not an argument about the existence of God, but about a relationship that is said to exist between God and morality.
Keeping that in mind, an argument for claim 1 above is:
- God exists
- If God exists, then he created morality.
- If God created morality, then God's commands made actions morally right, wrong, or neutral.
- Conclusion: God's commands made actions morally right, wrong, or neutral.
The Euthyphro argument is aimed at premise 4.
THE EUTHYPHRO ARGUMENT: What does it mean to say that God's commands are good?
The Euthyphro argument is named after Plato's Euthyphro, in which Socrates poses the question, "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?" (10a). The Euthyphro Argument rests on a modernized version of the same question: "Does God command certain actions because he knows what makes actions morally right, wrong, or neutral; or, are actions morally right, wrong, or neutral because God commands them?If the former case is correct, and God knows/sees/understands that certain actions have moral status (examples - killing is bad, stealing is bad, giving to worthwhile charities is good) then those acts have that moral status regardless of what God commands. Then divine command theory would be wrong because morality would not depend on God's commands.
If the latter case is correct, and God creates morality by commanding things, then anything he could command would be as good as anything else. There would be no moral reason to command one thing rather than another; morality would be arbitrary.
The problem for proponents of DC is that morality does not seem to be arbitrary. If actions were morally good because God commanded them, then God could have commanded that we hate our neighbor, and that we kill innocent people; and those actions would then be morally obligatory. But it seems as though killing innocent people would be wrong, even if God commanded it.
Moreover, it would trivialize the idea of God's goodness. Believers want to say that God's goodness is part of what makes God worthy of worship. If actions are good by virtue of God's will, then "God wills what is good" is equivalent to "God wills what God wills," and the latter statement doesn't seem to make God worthy of worship.
When I saw this argument for the first time as a sophomore in college, I was stunned. I had been firmly of the belief that morality did depend on God's commands! Eventually I accepted the point of the argument.
28 comments:
• What makes an action morally right, wrong, or neutral is God's command.
Mary P. is right; you need to go back one step.
Morality is not rooted in God's commands; it is rooted in God's character. God is good. Any action that is consistent with God's character is "moral". Any action that is inconsistent with God's character is, by definition, immoral.
God wills that we behave consistently with his character. If God would not blow up civilians to promote a political cause, we shouldn't do it either. If God "causes His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous" (Mt. 5:45) — i.e., if God blesses all human beings indiscriminately — we should go and do likewise.
Of course, this leaves a big question unanswered. What is God like? How do we have any knowledge of God's character that we can hold to with any degree of confidence?
But that's a next step. For now, I'm just saying that I reject the "Divine Command" theory of morality; but the Euthyphro argument is irrelevant to me.
The Euthyphro argument responds to premise 4, If God exists, then he created morality. But God didn't create morality; morality inheres in God's character, so it has existed as long as God has. Even if God never spoke a single command, morality would exist as an objective standard against which our actions could be judged.
I am encouraged that Mary P. is of the same opinion. She comes from a different denominational background, and she doesn't have seminary training, but her understanding of the origin of morality is the same as mine.
Q
Clear, orderly, concise. Nicely done!
Thanks, Mary P. I wish I could take all the credit for that, but Korcz and other philosophers who have studied this deserve most of it.
... I never believed that morality depended on God's command.
I like the way you think. There seem to be a lot of people out there who think the same way you do. Unfortunately for me, I did not think this way at the time and this argument caused me a lot of stress.
I believed that God created literally EVERYTHING. If so, and if he is literally ALL-knowing then he MUST have known from the beginning which actions would be morally right and which morally wrong, yes? It took me a long time to adjust to the idea that there could be something (anything!) out there that God did not create or god did not know.
These days, I am told, virtually all serious and learned theologians accept that morality is independant of God's existence, even though it may pose a problem for God's omniscience.
now I can see that there are some morally questionable commands in the Bible. What does one do with those?
You hint at another problem with DC, which is, how do we know what God has commanded?
Not having a great understanding of Philosophy I may be way off base with what I am about to say, so I will pose it in the form of a question.
Can right and wrong exist without God? If so why / why not?
I tend to believe in few absolutes, but I tend to think there are things that are morally wrong and therefore there are things that are morally right, even with the absence of a devine being.
Why; because I believe that if the two concepts did not exist God would be compeled to create them.
For example in order to create mud God had to create dirt.
In order for God to create man right and wrong had to be defined first.
-------------------------------------
That said, I'm not sure that God commands as much as leads by example.
Notice that there is a distinct difference between the way Devine influence is revealed in the old and new testiments of the Christian Bible.
The metaphorical approach of Jesus Christ, and his emphasis on the spirit of the law, would tend to make a shift to the "less literal ... Interpretation of the Bible" (thanks Mary P.) a more valid approach.
Thus does God really command our morality, or now lead by example?
Morality is not rooted in God's commands; it is rooted in God's character.
Q, what you have expressed was another of my own reactions (although I never said it so eloquently).
If what you say is true, then moral goodness is a property of God over which God has no control. But the idea of goodness, it seems to me, involves an element of choice. "God is good" is true only if God is capable of doing evil and chooses not to do so.
If God merely has to "act in a manner consistent with his character," then we are back to "God wills what God wills." It's strange to think that God would create us with free choice, if God had none.
Can right and wrong exist without God? If so why / why not?
Bill, you are driving at an important issue. Do right and wrong even exist, if God did not create them? I think that the answer is yes; there is good evidence that objective moral principles exist. But that is the subject for another post.
In order for God to create man right and wrong had to be defined first.
Please forgive me, Bill; I'm not sure what you mean by this. If you elaborate I might be able to respond.
That said, I'm not sure that God commands as much as leads by example.
The manner in which God makes God's wishes known is not at issue. The issue raised by the argument is whether God created morality.
Snaars:
It's becoming clearer that you studied philosophy, whereas my expertise (such as I have) is in biblical and historical theology. The discussion is quickly becoming one of those "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" issues for me. That is, its intellectual significance and practical relevance is beginning to elude me.
Is God subordinate to anyone or anything outside herself? Such a thing is impossible, if we are committed to the principle of God's omnipotence and sovereignty.
Therefore morality must inhere in God, rather than be something apart from God, to which she herself is accountable.
But this is not to deny that God has free will. She could commit immorality … but she wouldn't, because such a thing is alien to her character.
To me, this seems like a coherent position. Maybe there's a philosophical problem but, if so, I can't see it. Perhaps the concepts are too abstract for me to get my head around, non-philospher that I am.
Q
The discussion is quickly becoming one of those "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" issues for me. That is, its intellectual significance and practical relevance is beginning to elude me.
I laughed out loud when I read your last comment, Q. I think that is your way of telling me I'm off my rocker.
Introducing God's character does not solve the problem, it only complicates it a little bit. Let me try a different approach to the problem.
The intellectual significance and practical relevance is, in part, that if the Divine Command theory is true, then to say that God is Good would be meaningless - you might as well say that God is God. "Goodness" would become simply the name that we give to God's actions, since God would exist in a moral vacuum and whatever God would do (according to her character, if you will) would be "good". Morality would be arbitrary.
If morality were arbitrary, then if God had done something else (say, if her character had been different) then she could have said that killing innocent people, stealing, raping, etc., were good things to do. But it seems that those things would still be morally wrong, even if God's character were different from what it is. Perhaps you would want to commit to the idea that morality is arbitrary; I have no wish to do so.
You could object that God's character is eternal and cannot change. I will not argue the point, because it doesn't matter. It is enough that we can imagine God's character being different from what it is, just as we can imagine your character or my character as being different from what they are.
What does it mean, Q, to say that God acts according to her character, yet has the free will to do otherwise? Is it possible for God (or anyone) to act out of character? If yes, then God has free will - then God chooses to do good. Then God is acting according to principles of goodness that exist apart from her.
Is God subordinate to anyone or anything outside herself? Such a thing is impossible, if we are committed to the principle of God's omnipotence and sovereignty.
These are your words, not mine. Perhaps your understanding of and commitment to these things is the source of your confusion.
I don't know that omnipotence is a coherent concept. If you like, perhaps you can tell me what you think it means and we can discuss it later.
Let me begin with the easiest question. It comes as a sweet relief, after a day spent trying to catch rainbows and moonbeams in a jar.
You ask me to define "omnipotent". To state the obvious, it means "all powerful". The significance of it is, anything God wills, he has the power to carry out. No being which opposes its will to the will of God has any chance of success.
I shouldn't have used the phrase, "if we are committed to the principle". I am, in fact, committed to that principle; but only because I think that the concept of "God" is otherwise meaningless. Omnipotence is one of the attributes of God. Any being that lacks omnipotence is, by definition, not God.
If there are many lesser deities, competing with one another for sovereignty, such that none of them is all powerful, and none of them is eternally sovereign — then we've shifted to a totally different frame of reference and I would have to approach the argument very differently.
Now I return, somewhat reluctantly, to the realm of philosophical rainbows and moonbeams.
Upon further reflection, I'm not sure what your position is. I'm not even sure whether we agree or disagree.
You reject Divine Command theory. So did I, in my first comment. Morality is not rooted in God's commands, I said, it is rooted in God's character. We appear to agree with one another insofar as we both reject Divine Command theory.
After that, our positions diverge. (I think.) If I understand you correctly, you're arguing that morality exists apart from God. You said, to Mary P., These days, I am told, virtually all serious and learned theologians accept that morality is independant of God's existence. But is that your own position, or merely the position of "serious and learned theologians"? I'm not sure.
In fact, I know you're an atheist. Perhaps you will understand my confusion in the present context, when you, an atheist, are talking about God at considerable length. I feel like you're setting me up for the punchline and I wonder whether I am foolish to play along.
I imagine that you hold to one of the following two positions:
(a) Morality exists independently of God, therefore we can dispense with the God concept altogether; or,
(b) there is no morality, no absolute distinction between right and wrong.
I need to know what you believe before I can respond intelligently to it. But I will demonstrate that I am a fool and continue writing, in an attempt to define the parameters of the debate.
For me, what matters is this: is there any such thing as an objective moral standard, against which human actions can be judged? This is a subject worth arguing about. (Much more so than the question about angels and pinheads.) The answer to the question will have profound ramifications.
I believe there is an objective moral standard, and I believe it is rooted in God's character.
You may argue that there isn't; but then I will ask you whether genocide is a morally defensible act; and perhaps I will list other such behaviours that are generally considered to be morally repugnant.
Alternatively, you may argue that there is an objective moral standard, but it exists apart from God.
In that case, I must tell you that I have no idea what you're talking about. A "moral standard" is not a living being (unless we equate it with God's being), so it cannot have personal existence. A "moral standard" is not a material object, so it cannot have physical existence.
What then, does Snaars mean, I will ask, when he says that there is an objective moral standard and it exists independently of God — independently of anybody or anything? How is such a thing possible?
If it isn't clear to you yet, I'm attempting to smoke you out of your burrow, Snaars.
Q
I see. I am a pinhead hiding in a burrow, chasing after rainbows and moonbeams, and calling on everyone else to follow after.
If this is the best logical argument you can come up with, Q, then I am sorely disappointed. But then again, I am just an atheist and can't possibly have any sense of moral standards so why should you care what I think?
I need to know what you believe before I can respond intelligently to it.
Why should you have to know what I believe in order to respond to the arguments I laid out, I thought quite clearly? If you need clarification, just ask for it. If you disagree, you have every right to do so. But please, don't play these rhetorical games. If it's so foolish for you to continue writing, then it's doubly foolish for me to give in to your demands to divulge all my personal beliefs and account for my atheism. Nevertheless, I will attempt it.
Perhaps you will understand my confusion in the present context, when you, an atheist, are talking about God at considerable length. I feel like you're setting me up for the punchline and I wonder whether I am foolish to play along.
I am not waiting in the bushes to ambush you, Q. I understand that the argument has implications for your understanding of God and morality. I am not trying to make you an atheist. As I said from the beginning, the argument is about the nature of morality, not the existence of God. I would like to point out that another person of faith posted a comment and didn't seem to have any problem with the argument at all.
I am not now, nor have I in the past, used subterfuge on this blog in order to further an argument. After study and long consideration, I have come to a lack of belief in God. I have not tried to hide that.
I imagine that you hold to one of the following two positions:
(a) Morality exists independently of God, therefore we can dispense with the God concept altogether; or,
(b) there is no morality, no absolute distinction between right and wrong.
As a matter of fact, you are wrong on both counts. My reasons for "dispensing," as you put it (not my word of choice), with God have very little to do with this argument. I will not deny that acceptance of the argument was a turning point for me, as I suggested in an earlier comment.
Perhaps you overlooked my response to Bill in which I wrote: Do right and wrong even exist, if God did not create them? I think that the answer is yes; there is good evidence that objective moral principles exist. But that is the subject for another post.
You seem to need more from me, so I will elaborate on what it is that I believe. I believe that objective moral principles exist. I think these principles arise, at least in part, from the needs, desires, motivations, interactions and relationships between humans and other intelligent beings, if they exist (including God, should it turn out that I am mistaken and God exists). I do not believe that we need appeal to any superhuman agency to explain the existence of these moral principles.
I don't think that the Euthyphro argument "proves" that moral principles exist apart from God. I think it makes clear that it is far more plausible than not that moral principles exist apart from God's will. Moreover, this interpretation of the goodness of God is the more conservative one - it better preserves the traditional theistic conception of God, and it preserves the concept of goodness, rather than trivializing it.
After I had accepted the argument, I consulted with individuals whose opinion I respected. Among them was my father, who is a Christian pastor, a well-read and intelligent man, who has a Master's degree in theology. He assured me that this is the consensus among scholars. Other professors I have had and books I have read have confirmed it. Nevertheless I understand that agreement is not universal. You are of course welcome to your own opinion.
A "moral standard" is not a living being (unless we equate it with God's being), so it cannot have personal existence. A "moral standard" is not a material object, so it cannot have physical existence.
Because this question of how moral principles exist seems to be the only serious one in your entire post, I will do my best to answer it, even though it is late and I am tired and cranky now.
I'm not sure I know what you mean by a moral standard's "personal existence". I agree that a moral standard is not a person and that it is not a material object. Nevertheless a moral standard can exist. Even if God created/comanded/willed-into-being moral standards, or if moral standards were a part of God's character, they would not be physical objects.
Numbers are not physical objects, yet they seem to exist. Would "2+2=4" cease to be true if God willed it, or if God's character were different?
Honestly, Q, you surprise me! I have to admit you got me riled. I feel better now that I've vented though. Feel free to comment again if you can keep away from the rhetoric. Once we both calm down I hope you'll be willing to shake virtual hands and agree to disagree.
At that point, I will be willing to discuss with you the concept of omnipotence.
I haven't read your whole comment yet. I'm just popping in to say, I apologize for having offended you.
I hope you can accept it when I say that you took my last comment in a different spirit than I intended it. I took my cue from the opening statement in your comment: I laughed out loud when I read your last comment, Q. I think that is your way of telling me I'm off my rocker.
Of course, I don't think you're off your rocker. I guess I made a mistake by mixing together genuine, substantive content, with remarks that were meant to be playful. The stuff about philosophical rainbows and moonbeams, for example, wasn't meant as a putdown.
I didn't call you a pinhead. I was referring to the medieval dispute about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
But I was serious about not understanding your point of view. Yes, you did a good job explaining the Euthyphro argument, as Mary P. said. But I genuinely needed clarification about your own position; for example, when I wrote:
"You said, to Mary P., These days, I am told, virtually all serious and learned theologians accept that morality is independant of God's existence. But is that your own position, or merely the position of "serious and learned theologians"? I'm not sure."
I am very sorry to have offended you. Obviously I expressed myself clumsily, and I regret it. But it was meant to be playful banter; I was not feeling any anger whatsoever as I wrote.
I'll go back and read your comment now. But I'm certainly feeling dispirited.
Q
• I am just an atheist and can't possibly have any sense of moral standards.
For the record, I don't believe that. There are lots of immoral believers, and lots of profoundly moral atheists in the world.
I am taking your argument seriously. Whether someone is an atheist or a theist does not predetermine the validity or falsehood of any of their opinions.
• Numbers are not physical objects, yet they seem to exist. Would "2+2=4" cease to be true if God willed it, or if God's character were different?
This is a good argument, in response to a genuine question of mine. At this moment, I don't know what to make of it, or what its implications may be. I'm going to mull it over a while, but I promise I'll be back to discuss it.
Q
Q, You say that I took your post in a spirit that was not intended by you, and I believe you. Please forgive me for over-reacting. I guess I'm more defensive when it comes to my atheism than I realized.
The fault is mine, not yours.
I hope my hasty reaction does not discourage you from posting again, because I enjoy your comments and I respect your opinion.
A p.s. to Q: reading back, I think it was the thoughtless comment from Anonymous that really put me on edge. I'm sorry to have taken my anger out on you.
I'm relieved that you're giving me the benefit of the doubt. I greatly enjoy our exchanges, and it has put me into quite a funk this morning, to know that I hurt you.
My personal history is such that I'm not in a position to throw stones at anyone. For fifteen years I was an evangelical; for most of those years I was a leader in various churches. When my convictions changed, my fall from grace was very public, and people found it very threatening.
I compounded the offence by divorcing my wife, thus committing a serious moral breach. Needless to say, my evangelical former colleagues and friends do not think very highly of me. I left myself open to the charge that I had abandoned my faith solely in order to divorce my wife. It was false; my theological convictions had evolved over a period of years, quite independently of the problems in my marriage. But the upshot was, I lost all but one of the friends I had from those fifteen years.
The point is, you don't need to be defensive about your atheism: not with me. You have to be true to your convictions, just as I am to mine. If other people are hurt because you reject something that means a great deal to them, it's regrettable. But what is the alternative, to pretend you believe something you really don't? Then you're guilty of hypocrisy. Hypocrites didn't score very well with Jesus, let me tell you.
Furthermore, I'm not threatened by your atheism. It is my policy to look squarely at the facts. If my faith (what remains of it) is not set on a firm foundation, so be it. I will follow the truth wherever it leads, whatever it may cost me. And I don't make that statement lightly, because I've lived it out. (In fact, I lived through it twice: once when I converted into the evangelical church, and a second time when I converted back out of it.)
So be as provocative as you want: embrace outrageous heresies, defend immoral deeds, criticize my convictions. Unless your arguments are aggressively ad hominem, you'll have a hard time offending me.
By the way, if you want to discuss any of this privately, my e-mail address is on my home page under the site counter. I should add that I don't check my gmail address very frequently, so don't take it personally if I don't respond to an e-mail immediately.
Q
i'd like to add something to this discussion, if you don't mind. it seems to me that your difference in opinion is almost semantic.*
let me restate what i understand of your argument at this point before i add my two cents, so it will be clear where i'm coming in. what you guys seem to be doing is debating whether there is an objective moral standard, outside of god's character. (previously you were debating whether there was an objective moral standard outside of god's will, but q refined the argument by saying that he does not believe morality is rooted in god's will; rather, he believes it is rooted in her character.**)
so, the argument is as follows. take the sentence, "god is good." it can be read in one of two ways.
the first reading of the sentence says: god [noun] is [verb] good [adjective].
this reading of the sentence encourages the argument that morality exists independently of god. in this reading, we can point to the word "good" and say, look, we call god "good." if we can do that - call god "good" [adjective], then doesn't the quality "good" exist independently of god? if not, then why bother to call god "good" at all? and doesn't saying that "good" cannot exist outside of god make god's goodness less significant, because at that point, she simply is what she is, without choice?
to which, someone might reply (much like q did): no, she is capable of doing "bad," but she chooses not to, because it is not in her character.
i would have a follow-up question for q regarding that answer (what is character? is it not the choices we make?) except i have a hunch how he might read the above sentence... god [noun] is [verb] good [noun]. am i right, q?
in that reading of the sentence, god simply is good. there is no other way of defining her. and to say that goodness exists outside of god is pointless because she is good and good is she, period.
if that is the case, though, q... i think you contradict yourself. when you replied to snaars' self-effacing comment that he was just an atheist who couldn't possibly have any sense of moral standards with the statement:
For the record, I don't believe that. There are lots of immoral believers, and lots of profoundly moral atheists in the world.
you yourself seem to be accepting, at the very least, the fact that people can behave morally outside of their belief in god or lack thereof (i believe this was discussed in a previous post), which begs the question: if one does not have to be a believer to behave morality, if one can understand what morality is and behave morally with no understanding of god whatsoever, can we really say that morality stems from god herself?
or do you mean to say that when people behave morally without knowledge or understanding of how it relates to god, because they think they can recognize goodness separately, what they are actually recognizing is godliness, because those two concepts are one and the same?
i think the reason many philosophers feel compelled to argue this point with religious people (at least i know the reason arglor likes to argue this point) is there is great value in getting religious people to admit that there are objective moral standards outside of god, because if we can get everyone to believe that (of all different faiths), we can define these objective moral truths and work toward building a society in which we can stop arguing over religion, and in which all people behave morally regardless of faith.
a note to snaars for a future post. you know what i would like to hear sometime, if you would feel comfortable writing it? i'd like to hear you and arglor explain what your reasoning is for being atheist rather than agnostic. i'm curious... it always seemed to me as if atheism was almost as much a leap of faith as religion.
---
(*) a philosopher, a theologian, and a writer walk into a bar. ha, ha...
(**) by the way, i'm intrigued to see how first q and then snaars begin referring to god using the feminine pronoun halfway through this discussion. brava!
Thanks, Mayfly, I found your analysis helpful.
• if one can understand what morality is and behave morally with no understanding of god whatsoever, can we really say that morality stems from god herself?
I have only one reason for maintaining that morality is rooted in God's character. As I stated above:
For me, what matters is this: is there any such thing as an objective moral standard, against which human actions can be judged? … The answer to the question will have profound ramifications.
Expressed another way, I am uncomfortable with the idea that it is up to human beings to define morality as they see fit. Neither you nor Snaars seems to be defending that position. So, Mayfly, you're probably right — my disagreement with Snaars ultimately doesn't amount to much. But maybe Snaars will see it differently, I don't know.
It doesn't matter to me whether morality is defined by God (through her commands, or through comparison with her moral perfection) or whether morality exists independently of God. What matters is that it is an objective standard, not one that human beings create (by means of a vote, or a philosophical consensus, or whatever).
Until Snaars set forth his mathematical analogy, I simply didn't understand how it was possible for morality to be freestanding. (There's a good word — freestanding! That says it very nicely.) I thought morality would inevitably be subject to the vagaries of human opinion, which changes from culture to culture and from one historical era to another.
Even if morality is rooted in God's character, I see no reason why atheists could not behave morally. As St. Paul puts it,
when Gentiles, who do not have the law, instinctively do what the law demands, they are a law to themselves even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts. Their consciences testify in support of this, and their competing thoughts either accuse or excuse them on the day when God judges what people have kept secret. (Romans 2:14-16)
The problem arises only if we subscribe to a rigorous form of Calvinism. Calvinism says that human beings are utterly depraved, and there is no good impulse in us unless God puts it there. Even in that case, Calvinists must hold that God sometimes moves athiests to do a good thing. But I have never been a Calvinist, and I don't know exactly how they would approach the issue.
The other objection which has been up for discussion concerned God's sovereignty; whether God could be held accountable to this objective moral standard that exists apart from her.
Theologically, I still find that point objectionable. But I am, in the end, quite pragmatic about this sort of difference. If it makes no practical difference for how we live our lives (whether atheists, agnostics, or theists), I'm not going to invest much energy in the question.
btw, Mayfly — Coincidentally, on Sunday, my pastor spoke on a subject that is not far removed from the issues Snaars posted on. I've summarized the problem the pastor identified, and the solution he proposed to it, on my blog. I'd certainly be interested in your input.
Q
whoa.... hehe... wow...
damnit... i even signed with an allusion to Berkeley's greatest story about Nietzsche thinking that would give my identity away... hehe... i ..hmmm.. ok here we go..
The explanation:
Mary and I were reading your blog when it hit me that the concerns you were raising about the argument stemmed from every part of the argument, except the true crux of the argument, which is known to be god's existence. When i took that class the E-A was meant to explain why god couldn't create morality which it does in a very solid manner, but Dr. Korcz (maybe Berkeley) and I joked once about how the argument's real failure is it's reliance on God.
It was always kind of a philosopher's hammer in my mind to the whole dispute.
Once i realized the above statement it hit me that there is one major philosopher that always uses the hammer reference towards moral codes and even god, and that is Nietzsche. When i came around to that idea i thought it would be hillarious if i were to make a post as though i were Nietzsche coming from the grave to "pass on the news from the mountain".
I threw in the horse quote thinking it would make the whole post absurd enough to make you guys, specially snaars, that it was me. Apparently it wasn't done well since you guys seem to be so thoroughly engaged in mortal philosophising. I think i'm going to remain a lurker.... or at least sign my posts with a postscript saying ignore the idiot. ;)
hehe remember rainbows and moonbeams are beautiful things to chase after...
uhmmm i think my post stands for itself... it is not an apology because my quoting a philosopher in a post about philosophy shouldn't have been interpretted offensive...
he knows my feelings about Nietzsche and that i use Nieztsche tongue in cheek. Trust me though, i think i might become a lurker until i can spend the time necessary to actually think out posts/replies for his blog though because apparently this is a haven for "black belt" argumentation, to quote Berkeley again, and not rundame mububblimmgs.
BTW i meant to include this in my earlier post... Before Nietzsche died he was found appologizing to a horse in the middle of a street for descarte's failure to recognize the souls of animals... thats the explanation for the non-phil department peeps reading these comments...
For me, what matters is this: is there any such thing as an objective moral standard, against which human actions can be judged? … The answer to the question will have profound ramifications.
Expressed another way, I am uncomfortable with the idea that it is up to human beings to define morality as they see fit. Neither you nor Snaars seems to be defending that position. So, Mayfly, you're probably right — my disagreement with Snaars ultimately doesn't amount to much. But maybe Snaars will see it differently, I don't know.
you're right... i was not saying that i think it should be "up to human beings to define morality as they see fit." but i do think that we, as human beings, need to try to "discover" what morality is, independent of religion, so that we can cease these petty arguments about how the bible, koran, upanishads, apocryphal gospels, and all the other sacred texts of the world say we should behave and start agreeing about how we should behave. we're such a diverse planet; we're never going to agree on religion - at least not anytime soon. but we can agree on morality. and if religious people want, they can say to themselves - those silly atheists! - they think we're defining what goodness is outside of god, when what we're really doing is defining god's character or god's will. and the muslims can say, ha! those silly christians! - they think we're defining goodness according to their god, but we're really defining it according to allah. and so forth and so on, ad nauseum.
a little background: i used to think that morality was a social construct, and it varied by religion and culture and so forth. but this is one of arglor's favorite topics to discuss, and he - a staunch atheist, mind you - firmly believes that there is an objective moral law that we should work to "discover." he compares it to the law of gravity, and i'm not sure how i feel about that metaphor, but after talking with him, i have come to the following conclusion.
ON THE DEFINITION OF MORALITY
(1) morality is defined as the rightness or wrongness of actions
(2) the rightness or wrongness of actions has been defined in different ways by different thinkers in different times and different places.
(a) some say the will of god (or some other deity or group of deities) dictates the rightness or wrongness of actions.
(b) others want to define the rightness or wrongness of actions in a more objective manner - a manner that would work across cultures, religions, and so forth.
(c) in order for an objective moral code to be functional and applicable in all human situations, we must strive to define it using language and constructs that do not evoke culture, religion, and so forth.
ON "DISCOVERING" MORALITY
now this is where i run into trouble.
arglor says that we can "discover" morality using logic, that is, refine our definition of it to the point that it will one day be functional and applicable.
for example, he says, if we hypothesize that a law (for example, "thou shalt not kill") is part of the objective moral code, and we can come up with situations in which this law is not true (for example, if our own lives are being threatened), then this cannot part of the objective moral code.
he enjoys studying ethics, the study of morality, and has studied how non-religious definitions of morality have changed over the years. one of the more recent ethical theories was utilitarianism. this was the moral theory that says to behave ethically, you must always choose the action that leads to the greater good for humanity. here, "the greater good for humanity" means the result with the most pleasurable effects that causes the least suffering (mills, the philosopher who came up with this theory, says we should also consider that higher pleasures, such as justice, wisdom, freedom - the intellectual pleasures, take precedence over pleasures of the flesh). but even this (somewhat advanced) moral theory runs into problems, when you consider that there are certain rights that individuals have, that make you wary of making decisions based on "the greater good."
the first example that shows mills' version of utilitarianism may be in need of being refined is the example of the immaculate surgeon, who has never lost a patient - and in all probability, never will. now, this surgeon has the opportunity to murder one person who would otherwise live and use his organs to save three other people's lives, who will otherwise die. according to utilarianism, the surgeon has the right to do this. but somehow, that doesn't seem right.
another example that shows the error of the theory of utilitarianism is the super-sneaky stealthy ninja peeping tom example. now, the super-sneaky stealthy ninja peeping tom is such a good peeping tom that no one will ever know that he is peeping. so, according to utilitarianism, it is moral for him to peep because the super-sneaky stealthy ninja peeping tom gets pleasure from peeping and is sad when he doesn't get to peep (perve!) and the only way any suffering would ever come from his actions would be if the object of the super-sneaky stealthy ninja peep found out they were being peeped on. but since that won't happen, there will never be any negative effects of his peeping escapades. so, according to mills' theory of utilitarianism, it is the moral action for that perve to keep on peepin'. which seems wrong too.
so the theory obviously has to be refined to take into account the rights of certain individuals... and so on.
now. q. you said:
It doesn't matter to me whether morality is defined by God (through her commands, or through comparison with her moral perfection) or whether morality exists independently of God. What matters is that it is an objective standard, not one that human beings create (by means of a vote, or a philosophical consensus, or whatever).
what's interesting about all this - the method by which ethicists come to these conclusions - is that you often hear them say, "this seems wrong," and this may make you uncomfortable because it may seem to you that people are creating the standard for morality "by means of philosophical consensus." but, i ask you, what if this is the case? what if, somehow, these philosophers are simply in the business of defining, in a non-culturally or religiously coded manner, the objective moral laws that you understand to come from god's character?
You're a very methodical thinker, Mayfly, and your writing is exceptionally clear.
Your last paragraph raises one issue that should, perhaps, concern me, and one that doesn't. With respect to the issue that doesn't concern me, I'll quote from earlier in your comment:
• i do think that we, as human beings, need to try to "discover" what morality is, independent of religion.
I concur. That's what I liked about Snaars' mathematical analogy. I understood immediately that he was saying there is an objective moral standard and it is incumbent on human beings to discover it.
I want all human beings to stand shoulder to shoulder in this task; all of us to recognize the importance of this endeavor, and each of us to contribute his or her intellectual and spiritual energy to the cause.
Religious people sometimes claim that all religions teach fundamentally the same thing, and this can become the basis of universal moral norms. But I've always been sceptical of that claim, mostly because religions do not agree on the most fundamental matter, the nature of God.
If religions disagree at such a fundamental point, I think we should just broaden the search for an objective moral standard to include everyone equally: theists, agnostics, and atheists alike.
What arguably should concern me is the comment, you often hear [ethicists] say, "this seems wrong".
Perhaps it should concern me because it suggests a subjective moral standard instead of an objective one. But I don't think that's what the ethicists are really saying. I think what they're saying is, there is an objective moral code, but sometimes reason misleads us. Sometimes our hearts point us in a truer direction than our minds.
And that's a point with which I am in agreement. Despite my rationalist tendencies, I agree with Pascal: "the heart has its reasons that reason does not know".
Your examples with respect to utilitarianism interest me, but if I try to pursue this thought I'm not sure where it will lead. We'll certainly be off on another long tangent, so I'd better let it pass!
Q
more on your other post later, q. right now i've got to go to the grocery store and then teach a class...
I find myself in the awkward position of not being able to keep up with the discussion on my own blog. Everything that is being written looks interesting. I won't be able to give a reasoned response until I have had a chance to digest everything, and I probably won't have the time until tomorrow evening.
Arglor,
Thank you for explaining your anonymous post. It makes me feel a lot better. I have read some Nietzsche, but never formally studied it. I have heard that story, but not from Berkeley, and I didn't pick up on any clue that it was you. (also never heard Berekeley say "black-belt argumentation" - love that one!)
I have learned a lesson, which is that I should make sure offense is meant before I react. No need for anyone to apologize but me.
I think i'm going to remain a lurker.... or at least sign my posts with a postscript saying ignore the idiot.
Arglor, your posts are always welcome, but be prepared ... I know you tend to write according to the flow of your thoughts. As such you use loose grammar and little organization (if any), and you keep one eye on the clock. This is not a put-down, it's just the way you like to write on a blog. You are not too worried about precision. While this is fine and good for you, it can be frustrating for me, so please don't be offended or feel personally attacked if I take issue with your writings at times, when it just doesn't make sense to me. This happens a lot when I am in "analytical mode" and discussing philosophy. A small thing like the choice of a word here or there can make a big difference in how an argument is interpreted. When I am writing about something else, like family or current events, I think it's safe to say that you can write in any style you like and I will not fault you for it.
That being said, I know that you do have a lot of good ideas, and that you have a better and/or different grasp of some philosophical ideas than I have, and that you could do a lot to further intelligent conversation here. I value your input, such as it is. Whether or not you post, I will leave to your own capable judgement.
Q,
Part of the reason I was offended by Arglor's comment was that I did not know the source. I thought it was an anonymous, unreasoned, and cowardly ad hominem attack against me, on account of my atheism.
Arglor thought I would know that the post was from him, so it was an honest mistake. He is right, had I known the comment was from him, I would not have been offended. I feel that his explanation was apology enough.
In fact, you needn't have apologized to me either. I mistook your post as well. I took your wordplay as sarcasm and derision, and I see now that was not as you intended. The only things we (all three of us) are guilty of is miscommunication. I recognized this right away and apologized as soon as I realized I had ruined your day by responding the way I did. On another day, in another mood, I might not have reacted the way I did. For my part, I feel that nothing more needs to be said.
I have some more thoughts about the converstaion, which I will post later.
Everyone,
With Q's permission, I removed some of his comments. I also took the liberty of removing a few others.
Arglor, I'm sorry, without thinking it all the way through I removed your first Nietzsche comment. I'm not sure how to bring it back.
If anyone has any questions or concerns, or if you would like me to remove another of your comments, e-mail me. You can find my contact information in my profile.
Ok my last post on this thread... apparently i missed a lot while i was at work...
You could not have been more accurate in your summation Snaars, and as such i'm neither embarrased nor offended by it. I write free flow as always and very conversational usually working ideas out in succesesion. Therefore, i began to realize (particularly in the last post that degredaded into a discourse/debate about evil) that i couldn't really speak freely unless i recognized that my posts shouldn't be taken as hardcore argumentation.
p.s. i have always admired how easily it is for you and mary to construct your ideas in this medium, the patience you guys must have.
Hello. I just thought you might like to read this article:
"A Christian Answer to the Euthyphro Dilemma" (link).
Paul,
Thank you for your interest. If you comment again, please do not simply link to an outside article. Instead, summarize or explain the point of the article and why you found it compelling. I can't dialogue with an article.
As for the article: I skimmed through it and (to be quite frank) I found it tedious after the portions that summarized the Euthyphro. Since I already summarized the Euthyphro here, those parts of the article are redundant to this discussion.
Apart from the summary, the article seemed to me to muddy the issue by citing a lot of irrelevant and obliquely applied scriptures. The author affirms the soundness of the Euthyphro argument, then argues that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity circumvents the Euthyphro dilemma.
In virtue of God's being a trinity, the argument goes, He is able to bear witness to Himself; were He not a trinity, He would have no perspective from which to know His claims were justified. His own nature is the perfect standard of righteousness, therefore God need not look for any standard outside Himself. It's not clear to me what relevance "perspective" has to the issue, or why God would have to be three persons in order to understand His own nature.
I would point out that the author has a pointless mystical reverence for the number three, which he goes on about at great length.
The author makes arguments from ignorance against cosmology in order to put cosmology and theology on equal footing. Whether or not cosmology and theology are on equal footing has no relevance to the Euthyphro argument.
The author accuses Socrates and Bertrand Russell of prejudice, and does not explain how this wounds the Euthyphro argument. (The author already said the argument was sound!)
The author sets up a straw man by saying that atheists argue from an assertion that "God is good" is a tautology. The truth is that atheists CONCLUDE that "God is good" is a tautology, IN LIGHT OF the Euthyphro argument. The author has completely misunderstood and reversed this aspect of the atheist argument.
The author commits the fallacy of "Poisoning the Well" against possible atheistic counterarguments, saying that atheists will try to "sidestep" and "obfuscate" by introducing other issues. The outright arrogance of the author is revealed when he asserts that the Christian must close the door on any further discussion until the atheist:
● agrees that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity can answer the dilemma; or,
● demonstrates how it has not been answered; or,
● asks to change the topic; or,
● says, as Euthyphro himself ended his dialogue, "I am in a hurry, and must go now."
Well, Paul, I must concede that the Euthyphro dilemma HAS been answered. It just hasn't been answered well. You might as well argue that seven-legged venutians with super-dark sunglasses and a penchant for mischief recognize themselves to be the ultimate standards of goodness. It doesn't answer anything. Why are they good? You make the same argument when you say that God recognizes Himself as the standard for goodness. Why is God good? How does he recognize His own goodness?
In conclusion, I think I am genuinely channelling the spirit of Socrates when I say, "I am in a hurry, and must go now."
BTW Paul,
The question of God's own character being the standard for goodness has come up in this discussion. Please read above if you're interested in my opinion.
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